



UK IN A
CHANGING
EUROPE

**MINORITIES REPORT:
THE ATTITUDES OF BRITAIN'S
ETHNIC MINORITY POPULATION**

FOREWORD

The recent election saw a number of shock results, as constituencies containing a high proportion of Muslim voters registered disappointing results for the Labour Party. Though many had predicted the party would face some backlash from British Muslims in July 2024, the extent of it- and the success of several independent candidates standing in these same seats- was something missed by many pollsters and commentators.

This gets to the heart of an issue faced by political scientists for a long time. Research suggests that ethnic minority voters often have political and social views at variance with those held by the population as a whole, and indeed by other ethnic groups. Yet we often lack the data to examine these attitudes and how they differ.

This report aims to set that right. Here, we attempt to look at the diversity of political opinion, social values and economic preferences not just between Britain's white and non-white population, but between different ethnic and religious groups. We look not just at voting and elections, but more broadly at questions of identity, tolerance, and experiences of race and discrimination.

I would like to express my thanks to James Kanagasooriam and the team at Focaldata- Manon Allen, James Alster and Patrick Flynn - who carried out the survey and worked with us on the production of this report. Thanks too to Stephen Hunsaker, who produced a huge number of charts with remarkable efficiency, and to Professor Paula Surridge, Professor Rob Ford, Professor Maria Sobolewska and James Blitz for their help and consultation throughout. Finally, a special word of thanks to Zain Mohyuddin and particularly Sophie Stowers, who wrote the bulk of what follows. I'm sure they're every bit as relieved and delighted as I am that this report is finally seeing the light of day.

I hope you find this report interesting and informative. As ever, do get in touch if you have any comments or queries.

8 October 2024

Professor Anand Menon
Director, UK in a Changing Europe

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INTRODUCTION

Back in 2022 when I first discussed with Anand Menon the possibility of a deep polling study into ethnic minority Britons, my lodestar was Ashcroft Polling's seminal [2012 report](#) into non-white Britain and the Conservative Party. It's the report that basically convinced me to go into polling and has been of huge import both within the social sciences and politics. There have been large-scale studies since - but not that many.

There were lots of concerns about embarking on a report like Ashcroft's. Does it even make sense to conceive of non-white Britain as a group? How can we write in a neutral way without providing ammunition to bad faith actors on both sides of the political spectrum? How can we get around the methodological constraints of conducting an online poll of minority respondents when such groups are the people least likely to be polled well in online samples?

However, difficult challenges aren't an excuse for doing nothing. The perfect cannot be the enemy of the good. Our study is flawed, the data has real limitations, and the analyses are constrained by survey length and researcher time. The survey research was hard, time consuming, expensive, and politically divisive. Almost none of the economic or social incentives to do work like this are positive.

But the 2024 general election shows what happens when we don't have early warning signals for structural changes in the electorate. The paucity of information on the views and beliefs of non-white Britain should be a thing of the past.

Sophie Stowers and I were interested in discovering how ethnic minority Britons are different both from each other, and from white citizens on the axes of political voting behaviour, political values, personal values, experience of discrimination and representation and national identity.

Taking a step back, I think there are 10 main takeaways:

1. **We are at an inflection point in terms of how ethnic minorities vote.**

The fall of a clutch of Labour seats with large Muslim populations to Independents (and to the Conservatives in Leicester East) was not on anyone's election bingo card. Ethnic minority opinion now spans the entire political spectrum. The political, social and economic values of British Indians and British Chinese voters, and to a lesser degree Black African voters, are structurally different from other minority groups - in particular

British Caribbeans and British Muslims. These differences are not yet fully expressed in terms of voting behaviour (particularly due to the Conservatives' staggeringly bad defeat in 2024, where proportional swing hid large changes in voting behaviour), but will be in time as the former camp drifts rightward, and the latter to the left.

2. **We should not overstate how poorly the right performs, and how well the left does, amongst ethnic minority Britons.** At the 2024 election, the combined vote share of Labour, the Greens and the Liberal Democrats was 66% among ethnic minorities, while that for the Conservatives and Reform UK was 26%. Among white voters, the equivalent figures were 53% and 41%. Any discussion over Labour's problems with minority voters and Conservative gains needs to be tempered by these facts.
3. **The demography of right and left is vastly different between white and non-white voters.** White voters differ hugely on their educational profile, with non-graduates drifting right over the last 20 years, and graduates to the left. Amongst non-white Britons, graduate level education makes you proportionately more likely to be Conservative. Class cleavages and patterns that have disappeared from the voting patterns of white Britons exist and are indeed getting stronger amongst non-white voters. The Conservative Party will continue to have its esoteric coalition of affluent minorities and non-graduate whites and Labour the opposite. In other words, the Lee Anderson - Rishi Sunak spectrum is a feature, not a bug, of right-wing politics.
4. **There is a large degree of disagreement between ethnic minorities- to some degree larger than that between the white and non-white population- on the role of the state.** British Indians and British Chinese voters tend to be right wing on the economy, expectations of the nation state, and views on welfare. Other minority groups sit much more firmly on the left. If politics reorients to be based primarily around economic divisions, this may lead to even greater fragmentation of minority opinion.
5. **There are a clutch of issues - immigration and multiculturalism - where ethnic minorities are much more positive than the rest of Britain.** These issues have much less predictive power in estimating how non-white people vote than for white people. We also see that non-white Britons tend to be more concerned with Britain getting ahead economically and with material success than those who are white.
6. **At future elections, Labour cannot rely on ethnic minority voters as a 'bloc' of support.** It is true that the Labour Party still convinces a far greater proportion of minorities with 'warm' views of the party to vote for it than

the Conservative Party does. But among many ethnic groups, there is a fundamental disjunction between opinion on the salient issues of the day and voting patterns. Our polling suggests that Labour support among ethnic minorities is an ossified cultural and historical legacy that could disappear very quickly.

7. **There is evidence of some prejudice among certain ethnic minority voters toward other minority groups.** Clear and neutral data is needed to expound on these findings. Among some non-white groups, a minority - but in some cases a sizable minority - express anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment, which is not reflected to the same extent amongst the wider white population.
8. **The degree of importance placed amongst minority respondents on their personal religion is out of step with the growing secularism of white Britain.** To a degree, this substitutes out the importance of the nation state for minority groups - and is another area we would have explored more without time and resource constraints.
9. **There is a wide difference between minority groups on their experience of racism and of representation.** The British Caribbean and British Chinese populations represent two ends of the spectrum. British Caribbean respondents see themselves reflected much more in popular culture and positions of power, but personally perceive much higher rates of personal racism. Meanwhile, British Chinese people feel culturally excluded, but do not perceive anything like the levels of racism that other groups do. Certain ethnic groups are almost invisible from our television, radio and cultural spaces whereas Black Britons are not, with this gap confirmed by minority groups' own assessments.
10. **Ethnic minority and white Britons share common diagnoses about what is politically important, what they want out of a government, which cultural institutions are important, what British culture is, and what it means to be British.** Whilst the purpose of the paper is to alight on important and unique aspects of non-white Britain, there is far more that unites Britain than divides it.

This is just scratching the surface of a report that is a treasure trove of data on a complex array of topics. I would encourage you to read what follows in full, to get a full sense of our findings.

James Kanagasooriam

Chief Research Officer at Focaldata and Researcher at UKICE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE 2024 GENERAL ELECTION

- Labour has historically done very well among ethnic minority voters. The 2024 election was no exception; Labour led the Conservatives among ethnic minority voters by 29 percentage points, compared to 8 percentage points among white voters.
- Labour support in 2024 was more broadly spread among ethnic minority voters than it was among white voters. Labour was ahead of the Conservatives in every ethnic minority age group, educational bracket and social grade. Education and age had less of an impact on the strength of Labour support among ethnic minorities than among the white population.
- There were stark differences in Labour support between different ethnic subgroups. Labour lost support compared to 2019 among British Asians, particularly those identifying as Muslim.
- While Conservative support was down in 2019 among all ethnic groups, it was least so among British Asian voters, particularly those identifying as Hindus.

THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION AND POLITICAL VALUES

- British Indian, Chinese and Hindu respondents were the ethnic minority groups most likely to have voted Conservative in 2019.
- Ethnic minorities who did not vote Conservative in 2019 did so for the same reasons as white voters - they saw the party as representing the 'rich and powerful', as not being competent, and believed that public services have declined under the party's watch.
- It is ultimately important to all voters, regardless of their ethnicity, that a government is competent and can run high-quality public services.
- Ethnic minority voters and white voters share the same policy priorities, namely healthcare /the NHS and the economy. Non-white voters are just three percentage points more likely to say race and discrimination is an important issue than those who are white.

IDENTITY

- National identity plays an important role in shaping respondents' sense of self. However, ethnic minorities are somewhat less likely to prioritise being 'British' as a part of their identity than those who are white, particularly Black respondents.
- Both white and non-white respondents who think of themselves as British tended to lean toward the Conservatives at the 2019 election.
- Ethnicity does not play a large role in the identity of non-white respondents overall. However, it does tend to be more important to ethnic minorities than white respondents, particularly for those who identify as Black.
- Non-white respondents tend to show higher levels of religiosity than those who are white, and are more likely to see being part of a religious community as an important part of their identity.
- Ethnic minorities are more likely than white respondents to say that being a member of an economic or professional class is an important part of their identity. This is particularly the case among those non-white respondents who have recently migrated to the UK, or those whose families more recently arrived in Britain.

BEING 'BRITISH'

- The public have a relatively open approach to what 'Britishness' is, with few believing that being white, Christian, or having British ancestry is important.
- Few ethnic minority respondents feel excluded from being British on the basis of their race or religion.
- Britons are particularly proud of the NHS and the UK's educational institutions, with little difference in warmth felt toward most national institutions between the white and ethnic minority populations.
- It is more important to ethnic minority respondents that Britain is a diverse and tolerant country than for white respondents, particularly in comparison to older, white respondents with a below-degree level education.

DISCRIMINATION AND PREJUDICE

- There is a material (albeit relatively small) number of respondents who express more negative views toward welfare claimants, students, and LGBTQ+ people. A small, hardcore group also expresses racist views.

- Younger and degree-educated people (both white and non-white) are more likely to say race relations in the UK are poor than other respondents. They are also more likely to say that instances of racism and discrimination have become more common in recent years.
- The idea that white people face some discrimination is relatively popular among white respondents, particularly for older non-graduates.
- Believing race relations have worsened in recent years makes no difference to the likelihood of ethnic minority voters to vote for a left-wing party.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VALUES

- Ethnic minorities are more likely than white people to hold left-leaning economic values.
- Factors like age and education influence the economic values of all voters, albeit in different ways depending on their ethnicity.
- Some ethnic minority groups - particularly British Chinese and Indian voters - hold quite right-wing economic views in comparison to other ethnic minority voters. These views seem to have influenced the vote choice of these groups in 2019.
- White Britons hold quite authoritarian social views. Ethnic minority respondents also do, but to a lesser extent than the white population.
- While age and education impact the social liberalism of white voters, these demographic factors have little influence over the social values of ethnic minority voters.
- Being religious does not make a respondent more socially conservative; while Christian and Muslim respondents tend to be more socially authoritarian, those who are Hindu or Sikh are often more socially liberal than those with no religious affiliation.
- There is not as much variation between ethnic subgroups in their social values as there is in their economic ones. However, some groups do tend to be particularly authoritarian in their views on issues like LGBTQ+ rights.
- While social values tend to be a good predictor of vote choice among the white population, with those with more liberal values tending to vote Labour and vice versa for the Conservatives, this pattern is not as clear among ethnic minority voters.

THE 2024 GENERAL ELECTION

Labour's landslide victory at the 2024 general election was far from unexpected. Yet it generated several unforeseen outcomes, some of which may exert a significant impact on the structure of political competition in the UK in the years ahead. While Labour increased its vote share among many groups of white voters - winning a greater share of the vote than the Conservatives in multiple age groups and social grades - the party's performance among ethnic minority voters varied.


Labour has won a majority of ethnic minority votes at every election since data on ethnic minority vote choice has been collected ([1997 onwards](#), when Ipsos broke down general election data by ethnicity, and the British Election Study carried out a 'boost' of ethnic minority respondents, for the first time). At every election over the last twenty years, the Labour lead over the Conservatives among non-white voters has been in double digits.

The 2024 election was no exception. Our data shows that Labour led the Conservatives among ethnic minority voters by 49% to 20%. This was in stark contrast to the party's lead over the Conservatives among white voters, which was a much narrower 33% to 25%.

A key reason for this is that Labour support among the ethnic minority population in 2024 was broadly spread. Labour was ahead of the Conservatives in every ethnic minority age group, educational bracket, and social grade. Older ethnic minorities were far more likely to vote Labour in 2024 than white voters of the same age. Labour support was also not concentrated among non-white graduates, as it is among the white population. Instead, among ethnic minorities, higher education was associated with a greater likelihood of voting for the Conservatives at this election.

Older white voters were more likely to support the Conservatives in 2024 than ethnic minority voters of the same age

2024 Conservative vote share by age for ethnic minority and white voters




Source: Focaldata for UK in a Changing Europe, July 2024

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Among ethnic minorities, higher education was associated with a greater likelihood of voting for the Conservatives

2024 vote share by education level for ethnic minority and white voters



Source: Focaldata for UK in a Changing Europe, July 2024

This suggests that while Labour support is more broadly spread across the ethnic minority population, among the white population it is more concentrated among specific groups, specifically younger and university-educated voters.


Yet Labour’s celebrations in 2024 were punctured by some shocking losses in some of the country’s most ethnically diverse seats. In one of the biggest shocks of the night, Labour lost Leicester South, a constituency with a significant Asian community and the seat of Shadow Minister Jonathan Ashworth. The Conservatives made their only gain of the night in Leicester East, a seat which had been Labour at every election since 1987, with additional losses in traditionally ‘safe’ Labour seats to independent, pro-Palestinian candidates in Yorkshire, Lancashire, Birmingham and North London. Several high-profile Labour MPs in seats with large ethnic minority populations such as Ilford North and Birmingham Yardley clung on by just a few hundred votes.

On the face of it, all these results seem to [confirm the fears](#) of many leading Labour figures that the party’s ambiguous stance on the conflict in Gaza angered voters in some of its most diverse constituencies, especially those with large Muslim populations. In five of the seven seats that Labour lost, [over 25% of the local population](#) is Muslim. But these results also point to a deeper phenomenon: that while we often loosely talk about the ethnic minority vote in British general elections as a bloc, in reality there are stark differences in political attitudes between different ethnic communities.

To give some examples: while Labour lost significant support among Muslim voters, the party made some gains among Black voters and non-Muslim Asian voters.

Labour won a significant share of support from Black voters at the 2024 election

2024 general election party vote share by ethnicity




Source: Focaldata for UK in a Changing Europe, July 2024

Among Asian Muslims, the Labour vote was down 28% at the 2024 election, a remarkable shift in political support.

Labour lost the most support among ethnic minority voters from Asian Muslim voters

Labour and Conservative support from 2019 to 2024 by religion and ethnicity




Source: Focaldata for UK in a Changing Europe, July 2024

Our data suggests that at the 2024 general election, around 12% of British Muslims voted for the Green Party and 15% for other candidates, including independents. Indeed, Labour's support among ethnic minority voters fell in the West Midlands (-14%), Yorkshire and the Humber (-14%) and the East Midlands (-13%), all regions with constituencies where Labour lost large numbers of Muslim voters to pro-Palestinian independents on election night.

Labour lost the most support in English regions where large numbers of Muslim voters opted for pro-Palestinian independents

Ethnic minority Labour support change from 2019 to 2024, by region



Source: Focaldata for UK in a Changing Europe, July 2024

Meanwhile, shifting patterns of voting by non-white populations also had implications in seats held (and one won) by the Conservatives. The Tories' only gain on election night, and one that shocked most observers, was Leicester East. The party's victory clearly owes much to the fragmentation of the vote; two former Labour MPs stood and took 20% of the vote, alongside numerous other independents.

Fragmentation, however, was not the only reason for the swing to the Tories. Leicester East has the largest Hindu population of any constituency in Britain. It is reasonable to infer that the shift in voting behaviour of this demographic group was crucial to the seat becoming competitive. This would indeed be a repeat of a trend [we saw in 2019](#), where Leicester East witnessed the biggest swing from Labour to the Conservatives of any seat in which ethnic minorities made up over a quarter of the electorate.

While we do not have sufficient constituency-level data to confirm this, our national-level data indicates that while the drop in support for the Conservatives among Hindu voters was in line with the ethnic minority average, the weakest gains for Labour were found among this demographic group.

Harrow East also illustrates the strength of support for the Conservatives among Hindu voters. The Tory vote share in the constituency, which has one of the largest Hindu populations in England, fell by only 1% point from 2019 – nationally, the party's vote share declined by 21.3%. In a symbolic nod to the constituents who were central to his victory, re-elected Conservative MP Bob Blackman chose to swear [in as an MP](#) using both the Bible and the Bhagavad Gita.

What our 2024 data does not tell us is why some ethnic groups have become more likely to vote Labour while support among others has declined precipitously.

We also cannot see why Labour support continues to be more broadly spread among non-white voters compared to those who are white. Do minority voters simply vote on a different set of issues to white voters? Is there a significant difference in social values and economic preferences between non-white and white voters? And what role does religious affiliation play in determining how people vote?

This report attempts to answer these questions by looking in detail at why people voted as they did at the 2019 election. We analyse those voting patterns by means of in-depth questionnaires and surveys that we conducted with voters in 2023, that ask them to explain how they voted four years earlier.

We also go beyond voting behaviour to look at questions of identity and experiences of race and discrimination; then at the role played by voters' fundamental economic preferences and their social values. Throughout, we seek to go beyond simply looking at ethnic minority voters as a single group and try to examine differences between and within specific communities and faiths. This will help us not only to understand why ethnic minorities voted as they did at the general elections of 2019 and 2024 but what we can expect to happen at future general elections.

POLITICAL VIEWS AND VALUES

Voting patterns for white and non-white voters over time reveal a clear difference in the likelihood of each group to vote for the Labour Party, as opposed to parties on the right. At the most recent general election in 2024, the combined vote share of Labour, the Greens and the Liberal Democrats was 66% among ethnic minorities, while that for the Conservatives and Reform UK was 26%. Among white voters, the equivalent figures were 53% and 41%.

The relationship between ethnic minority voters and Labour dates back to the 1960s. With the arrival of the Windrush Generation between 1948 and 1971, ethnic minorities faced significant discrimination and hostility. By the mid-1960s, race and immigration were significant issues, culminating in Enoch Powell's 'rivers of blood' speech in 1968.

In opposition, Labour leader Harold Wilson was supportive of civil rights protest movements, and in government introduced legislation to criminalise racial discrimination. In his first period of office as Prime Minister, Wilson introduced the Race Relations Act 1965, which outlawed such discrimination for the first time, as well as creating the Race Relations Board. These initiatives arguably proved the catalysts for the relationship between non-white voters and the Labour Party.

Meanwhile, since the 1980s, Labour has had the most diverse backbench of any parliamentary party, as well as being the party of the Commons' first Black, Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Bangladeshi and Pakistani MPs. In terms of vote share, the party has continued to win a majority of ethnic minority votes at general elections, despite a dip in support among non-white voters in the 2000s, in large part due to the Iraq War.

Yet at recent elections, the Conservatives have begun to improve their electoral performance among ethnic minority voters. The party itself has become much more diverse, being home to the UK's first non-white Prime Minister, Chancellor and Home Secretary. It also moved much closer to Labour in its stance on anti-discrimination and equality legislation. Yet despite this, Labour has [maintained a formidable lead](#) among these communities in electoral terms.

Arguably, few of those who cast their vote for Labour in 2019 or 2024 did so explicitly because of the Wilson Government's approach to race relations 60 years ago. And so, we confront a question: are ethnic minority voters more

likely to vote Labour because of the party's position (or the Conservative Party's perceived position) on representation, race and migration issues? Or are ethnic minorities simply more instinctively left-leaning?

Here, we start by looking at the difference not only between white and non-white voters but between different ethnic groups at the 2019 general election (the most recent when this data was collected in 2023). The 2024 results suggest shifts in voting preferences within specific ethnic subgroups, which may have already been in train at the preceding general election.

We then go on to investigate the questions posed above and look more closely at the political values of British voters, how they vary between demographic groups, how these impact voters' views of politicians and parties, and indeed how all these factors vary between white and ethnic minority voters.

We find that:

- British Indian, Chinese and Hindu respondents were the ethnic minority groups most likely to have voted Conservative in 2019 - a pattern repeated in 2024.
- The reasons given by ethnic minority voters for not voting Conservative are similar to those given by white voters- that the party is seen to represent the 'rich and powerful', is not competent, and that public services have declined under its watch. Very few say they do not vote Conservative because the party does not represent them, or because it is nationalistic.
- Ethnic minorities tend to feel more positively about the Labour Party than the Conservatives, particularly when compared to white voters.
- All ethnic groups prioritise a government being competent and running high quality public services.
- Voters of Chinese, Indian and Caribbean heritage are particularly focused on government competence. These groups are also more likely than other ethnic groups to say politicians should be strong and effective, as opposed to intellectual or fair.
- Ethnic minority voters and white voters share the same policy priorities, namely the NHS and the economy. Non-white voters are just 3% more likely to say race and discrimination is an important issue than those who are white.

THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION


We asked respondents how they voted in the 2019 General Election. A caveat to this data is that people’s views and values may have changed in the period between the 2019 election, and when we asked them about how they voted in 2023. They may no longer feel comfortable saying who they voted for at that election. They may have also simply forgotten.

Across our entire sample, we found that the groups amongst whom the Conservatives performed best in 2019 were older and more likely had below degree-level qualifications. Labour support was strongest among younger and more highly educated voters.

Yet the starkest contrast was between white and non-white voters. While an average of 39% of white respondents voted Conservative in 2019, just 14% of ethnic minority voters did the same. Some 39% of ethnic minority voters voted for Labour, compared to 25% of white voters. Among ethnic minority voters, Labour had the most support of any party in 2019 across all age brackets, education levels, and religious groups. Although this phenomenon was repeated in 2024, it is all the more striking in 2019, given that, nationally, the election marked Labour’s worst performance since the 1930s.

At the 2019 general election, ethnic minority voters of all groups were more likely to vote Labour than Conservative

Responses by ethnic minority to the question “How did you vote in the 2019 General Election, or did you not vote?”



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

As among the white population, older ethnic minority voters were more likely to vote Conservative; just 14% of ethnic minorities aged 18-34 voted for the party in 2019, while 51% of those aged 55 and older said they did when we asked in late 2023. However, in contrast to the white population, university-educated ethnic minority participants were more likely to vote Conservative than non-graduates. In modelling, however, we see that part of this relationship may be explained by other factors influencing vote choice, like income.

We find some of the biggest variation when we break down the 2019 vote by ethnic subgroup. Here we find that British Chinese and Indian respondents were the most likely to say they voted Conservative in 2019 (21% and 23% respectively), albeit still much less likely than those who are white. Labour’s vote share was particularly strong among Pakistani (55%), Black Caribbean (45%) and Bangladeshi respondents (46%).


In the preceding section, we observed the significant decrease in support for Labour support among British Muslim voters at the 2024 election, where large numbers moved toward independent candidates and the Greens. Breaking down our ethnic minority data by religion, we see that this phenomenon did not happen in 2019. Almost half of Muslim respondents say they voted Labour in 2019 (49%), with just 2% saying they voted either for the Greens or an independent candidate.

There is also a particular interaction with religion among British Indian voters. Though Labour won more support across all ethnic minority religious groups than the Conservatives in 2019, their lead was smallest among Indian Hindus, at just 3%. This was a group where Labour did less well in comparison to other religious groups in 2024. Indian Sikhs, however, were much less likely to vote Conservative in 2019, with one of the strongest levels of support for Labour of any religious group.

Among the white population, very few respondents identify with any religion other than Christianity. There is, however, a marked contrast in the 2019 vote of white Christians and white non-religious respondents. While 50% of white Christians voted Conservative in 2019, just 29% of those who are non-religious did.

Ethnic minority Hindu voters were more likely to vote Conservative in 2019 than any other non-white religious group

2019 ethnic minority vote by religious identity to “How did you vote in the 2019 General Election, or did you not vote?”



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, Ethnic Minority sample, 2023

Taken together, this suggests that religion is an important influence over voting behaviour, among both the white and non-white populations. It also appears that while the movement of Hindu voters toward the Conservative Party was underway before the 2024 election, the movement of Muslim voters away from Labour is more recent.

WHY DO ETHNIC MINORITY VOTERS NOT VOTE FOR THE CONSERVATIVES?


In looking at why ethnic groups vote the way they do, we first need to ask: why are so many ethnic minority voters averse to voting Conservative?

We asked all voters who said they did not vote Conservative in 2019 why they did not. Respondents were presented with a list of potential ‘barriers’ to voting for the party, asking them to choose the ones which most closely resembled their own justifications for not voting Conservative.

Among the general population, the most commonly selected barrier to voting Conservative was that the party represented ‘the interests of the rich and powerful’ (19%), followed by ‘public services have got worse under them’ (14%) and that the party is ‘not competent’ (12%) and ‘does not share [the respondent’s] values’ (12%). Among white respondents who did not vote Conservative, we see that justifications commonly focus again on a lack of faith in the party’s competence and governing ability, law breaking, as well as concerns about the party not being for ‘people like them’.

White and ethnic minority voters share similar justifications for not voting Conservative in 2019

Response by those who did not voter Conservative in 2019 to “What are your main barriers to voting for the Conservative Party? Select up to three.”



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

There is very little difference in reasons for not voting Conservative between white respondents and those from ethnic minorities. Overall, non-white respondents are just as likely as those who are white to say that the Conservative Party does not represent ‘people like me’ or does represent ‘right wing

nationalism'. Black and mixed-race respondents are somewhat more likely to justify not voting for the Conservatives for these reasons than other ethnic groups, but even here the proportion is only slightly higher.

This suggests that there is no ethnic minority-specific reason to not vote Conservative; aversion to doing so among the ethnic minority population is broadly based on the same reasons we find among the white population.


Instead, then, we look to see if there are any particular reasons why white voters are averse to voting for the Labour Party. We see that a large number of white respondents cite concerns around Labour's competence and economic management, which ethnic minority voters tend to be less concerned with.

Some white voters - particularly those who are older and without a university degree - believe that the party 'represents the woke and very left wing' (13%). This is far less likely to be a concern to ethnic minority respondents (5%). This is the largest divide between white and non-white respondents; on all other 'barriers', there is little difference in the response patterns of the two groups.

Now we break down our ethnic minority sample into subgroups, to better understand why some ethnic groups may be more tempted to vote for the Conservatives- and not for Labour- than others. Looking at British Indian and Chinese voters, the two ethnic groups with the highest proportion of 2019 Conservative voters, the most common barrier to voting Labour concerns the party's competence, in particular its management of the economy for British Indians.

There is more concern around Labour's economic and overall competence among white voters than ethnic minority voters

Response by those who did not vote Labour in 2019 to "What are your main barriers to voting for the Labour Party? Select up to three."



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

PARTIES AND POLITICIANS

We attempted to get a sense of the relative warmth of voters towards different parties by asking respondents to give each party a ‘thermometer’ score between 0 and 100, where 0 represents no warmth and 100 a very favourable view of the party.


At the time we surveyed our respondents in 2023, Labour had consistently been polling ahead of the Conservatives for some time, following the fallout of the Truss Government’s mini budget, ‘partygate’, and an overall dip in the personal rating of then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. It is no surprise that, overall, respondents tended to feel more positively about Labour than the Conservatives (49 v 39).

Warmer views of Labour tend to be concentrated among younger, more highly educated voters. The Conservatives receive a more positive reception among older voters. While religion is not necessarily a strong predictor of warmth across the population, it is for Muslim voters, who were particularly positive about Labour.

Meanwhile, ethnic minority respondents feel more warmly toward Labour than the white population, with an average score of 62 compared to 47. As in the general population, Labour is viewed more positively among younger and more highly educated respondents, but the party is noticeably more popular than the Conservatives across all non-white demographic groups.

Ethnic minority voters think more positively about the Labour Party than those who are white

How warm do you feel towards each of the following parties? Please answer on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 means 'not warm at all' and 100 means 'very warm'.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023


We also see that ethnic minority voters tend to feel more warmly toward the Liberal Democrats, Greens, and (to a lesser extent) Reform UK than those who are white, giving all of these parties a higher score. This is despite the fact that we see electoral support for these parties (based on 2019 vote share) being lower among ethnic minorities than the wider population. This could suggest that ethnic minorities are generally less cynical about political parties.

Perhaps the most surprising finding is that, despite the significant differential in vote share for the party between white and non-white voters, there is little difference in ‘warmth’ scores for the Conservative Party. When we asked in 2023, 39% of white voters said they had voted Conservative in 2019, compared to just 14% of ethnic minority voters. Yet some groups of ethnic minority voters view the Conservatives more positively than white voters.

The party gets a particularly positive reception among those ethnic minorities with a degree level education or above, a stark contrast to the pattern we find among the wider population. British Chinese and Indian voters - the ethnic groups most likely to have voted Conservative in 2019 - as well as Black voters of African heritage have the warmest views of the Conservatives of any ethnic group. The relationship between Indian Hindus and the Conservatives is also evident here, with these voters particularly warm toward the party.

Voters of Indian, Chinese and African descent tend to be most positive about the Conservative Party

How warm do you feel toward [the Conservative Party]? Please answer on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 means 'not warm at all' and 100 means 'very warm'.




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

However, it is important to highlight that overall, even those ethnic minorities who feel the most warmly toward the Conservative Party are always less likely to vote Conservative than white voters who feel the same way, when controlling for other factors.

Even those ethnic minorities who are most positive about the Conservative Party are still more likely to support Labour

How warm do you feel toward the Conservative Party?/Imagine there was UK General Election tomorrow. Which party would you vote for?



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

POLITICAL VALUES

For all voters, concerns around competence and economic governance are barriers to voting both for Labour and the Conservatives. Yet the Labour Party still tends to be received more warmly by ethnic minorities than white voters.


This could suggest a difference in the characteristics of governments and politicians which ethnic minority and white voters prioritise. We investigate this by asking our respondents about their personal politics; participants are asked ‘when you think about your personal politics, what’s most important to you?’.

We see that voters are relatively ‘unsentimental’ when it comes to their political values. When asked what matters to them, few cite values, ideas around representation or engagement with the democratic process. Rather, voters tend to focus on the ability of politicians and parties to get things done, most commonly saying they think it is important that any government can be trusted to deliver high quality public services (51%) and manage the economy and deliver growth (40%).

Options which refer to a government standing up for them, social justice, or sharing their values are less commonly selected. Respondents’ political values appear to be shaped more by pragmatism than ideology.

Most voters think it is more important that a government is competent than representative

When you think about your personal politics, what's most important to you?
Select up to three (top 3 choices of each group)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023


Looking at the characteristics that voters most value in politicians, respondents tend to be more concerned with politicians being trustworthy, honest and fair than ambitious, enthusiastic, or even friendly. Overall, voters seem to prioritise capability over charisma. This could be a thermostatic reaction to a period where populist, charismatic politicians have been popular, while public concern about the state of public sector institutions has risen. Indeed, the successful candidate for Prime Minister in 2024, Keir Starmer, [led Conservative leader](#) Rishi Sunak on many 'competence' attributes, [though few](#) described him as a charismatic personality.

These values and preferences are linked to vote choice. Those whose personal politics and vote choice is oriented around competence, economic growth and control of public spending were more likely to have voted Conservative in 2019, and when surveyed in late 2023, said they would likely vote Conservative at the next election. Meanwhile, those focused on social justice and having a government which represents 'people like them' are both less likely to have voted Conservative (and more likely to have voted for Labour in 2019), and less likely to say they would do so at the next election.

Comparing white and non-white voters, ethnic minorities tend to prioritise representation, values, and capability more than white voters, who tend to prefer a government that can provide good public services and economic growth. However, these differences are small. Ethnic minority voters are also not overly concerned with electing people from a similar background.

Voters of all ethnicities are more concerned with the government being competent than being representative.

When you think about your personal politics, what's most important to you?




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023. Respondents were asked when you think of politics, which values are important to you. They were allowed to choose three. The "Competence" index is made of the following items: (1) I can trust government to keep taxes low; (2) I can trust the government to get public spending under control; (3) I can trust the government to run high quality public services like the schools and the NHS; (4) The government stops interfering with how I want to live my life (5) I can trust the government to manage the economy and deliver economic growth. The "Representation" Index is made of the following items: (1) I can trust the government to stand up for social justice; (2) I get to have my say in government decisions; (3) My elected representative come from the same background as me; (4) The government shares my values and priorities; (5) The government stands up for people like me. If 2 of the 3 responses an individual selects are from the "competence" list, they are classified as prioritising "Competence". If 2 of the 3 responses an individual selects are from the representation list, they are classified as prioritising representation.

We see a stronger contrast in the preferences of white and non-white voters when it comes to the personalities of politicians. Some ethnic minorities tend to place less emphasis on 'capability' characteristics, being less likely to say it is important for politicians to be effective or professional than those who are white. Instead, we see a greater emphasis on character, with ethnic minority respondents, particularly younger ones, more likely to say politicians should be intellectual, kind and ambitious.

Ethnic minority voters tend to place less emphasis on politicians' capability than white voters

What values or beliefs do you think are the most important for a political leader to have? Select all that apply. (Top 3 choices)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Chinese, Indian and Caribbean respondents, however, place a particular emphasis on politicians being competent. These groups are more likely than others to think politicians should be strong and effective and were also among the most likely to say they voted Conservative in 2019.

There is a clearer link between preferences around the personal characteristics of politicians and voting patterns among ethnic minority respondents than white voters. Those ethnic minorities who prioritised thoughtfulness, trustworthiness and kindness in politicians were all more likely to vote Labour in 2019 than those focused on confidence, strength and patriotism, who opted for the Conservatives. Though this pattern also exists among the white population, it is not as strong, suggesting that the character of politicians is a more politically sensitive issue among non-white voters.

In sum, personal politics and the values voters want to see in politicians do not vary much between white and ethnic minority voters, aside from a slight tendency to prioritise character and charisma over capability among some of the latter.

POLICY PRIORITIES

Policy priorities are another potential determinant of how people vote. We presented respondents with a list of policy areas and asked which they think are the three most important issues facing the country, ranked in order.


In keeping with similar surveys fielded by [YouGov](#) and [Ipsos](#), respondents prioritise the NHS, immigration and economic growth, with issues like education, childcare, and race and discrimination ranking less highly.

Yet we do not see much difference on the basis of ethnicity. In most cases, no issue is significantly more important to ethnic minority respondents than those who are white, and vice versa. The exception is immigration, which is considerably more important to the white population than ethnic minorities.

There is not a huge difference in the policy priorities of white and non-white voters, though the former are more likely to prioritise immigration



What do you think are the most important issues facing the country at this time? Please rank your top three (% ranking 1st)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

This salience of immigration is clearly a point of difference between ethnic minorities and white voters. It could be the salience of this issue that drives the support for the Conservatives and the Brexit Party/Reform UK among the white population which we do not see among those who are not white.

IDENTITY

The broad similarities we see in the political values and policy priorities of white and ethnic minority voters suggest that the source of the relatively high levels of support Labour enjoys among the latter lie elsewhere. In this section, we consider the importance of identity - national, ethnic, religious, and class-based - in order to see whether our respondents' political values and priorities may stem from these considerations. We asked our respondents a set of questions based around their sense of self; to unravel the roles that nationalism, local networks, and ethnicity play in their identities.

Responses indicate that:

White respondents were most likely to see themselves as a family member (64% place this in their top three identifiers), British (63%) and English (53%). For ethnic minority respondents, the most commonly chosen options were a family member (52%), British (46%) and a member of an ethnic group (37%).

- National identity plays an important role in shaping respondents' sense of self. Ethnic minorities are somewhat less likely to choose 'British' as an identifier than the white population, but this sentiment is primarily concentrated among Black respondents.
- Respondents who do see themselves as British tend to have leant toward the Conservative Party at previous elections.
- Ethnicity does not play a large role in the identity of non-white respondents overall. However, it does tend to be more important to ethnic minorities than white respondents, particularly for those who identify as Black.
- The UK as a whole is not particularly religious, and respondents do not often see religion as a core part of their identity. However, non-white respondents tend to show higher levels of religiosity than those who are white, and are more likely to see themselves as part of a religious community.
- This sentiment is concentrated among certain demographics, particularly Muslims.
- Class is not particularly important to Britons' identities. However, ethnic minorities tend to be more likely to choose being a member of an economic or professional class as one of their top three identifiers than white respondents. This is particularly the case among those non-white respondents who have recently migrated to the UK, or those whose families more recently arrived in Britain.

NATIONAL IDENTITY

For our questions on identity, respondents were presented with a list of ways in which they might describe themselves (British, English, a member of a religious community, a member of a family, and so on). We asked respondents to choose the three descriptors they most identified with and rank them in priority order.


National identity is an important part of many respondents' sense of self. When we examine the whole population, almost 60% of people in our nationally representative survey say they see themselves as British, with 26% saying this is their number one 'choice' of all the identifiers we presented them with. 49% also see themselves as English, with around 23% placing this descriptor in first place. Fewer describe themselves as Welsh (4%) or Scottish (8%), but this is likely due to the smaller sample sizes we have from these countries.

The propensity to identify as British varies with age. Older respondents tend to be more likely to choose English and British as one of their top three identifiers than younger respondents (particularly those aged 18-34), as well as more likely to place one of these as their first choice identifier. Education level is also an important influence, with those with a below degree-level education more likely to say being British is an important part of their identity than graduates (64% of respondents with a below degree-level education place this identifier in their top three choices, compared to 52% of those with a degree or above).

To understand whether national identity, and the propensity to see this as an important part of your overall identity, shifts with ethnicity, we now compare the responses of white and non-white respondents.

Ethnic minorities tend to be less likely to identify as both British and English compared to those who are white.

Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as...



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

White Britons are very likely to place British and English in their top three choices; 63% say they see themselves as British, with 27% ranking this as their


number one identifier. The equivalent figures for English are 53% and 25%. The exceptions to this rule, however, are younger, more highly educated, white respondents, who are less likely to choose ‘British’ as an option.

Meanwhile, ethnic minority respondents are less likely to place either British or English in their top three. Around 46% of ethnic minority respondents see themselves as British, while just 22% think of themselves as English. While younger and university-educated ethnic minority respondents are less likely to place ‘British’ in their top three than others, the difference between age and educational groups is not quite as stark as we see among the white population.

Age and education level have a bigger impact on the strength of national identity among the white population than among the ethnic minority population



Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as.... British?




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Among the white population, those who place ‘British’ in their top three identifiers are more likely to have voted Conservative in 2019 than Labour. 72% of 2019 Conservative voters say being British is an important part of their identity, compared to 60% of Labour voters. Of course, older voters without a degree are both more likely to identify as British and more likely to have voted Conservative in 2019 overall.

However, there is less differentiation between ethnic minority 2019 Conservative and Labour voters. 56% of non-white 2019 Conservatives see themselves as British, compared to 49% of 2019 Labour voters.

Those who see themselves as British were more likely to vote Conservative in 2019 than Labour

Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as.... British?




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Our findings indicate, then, that though a large portion of the ethnic minority population sees themselves as British, they are less likely than white people to prioritise this as a part of their identity. Age, education level and political orientation do not impact this tendency to the same extent as we see among the white population, suggesting that ethnic minorities are simply less likely to see themselves as British overall.

Indeed, across ethnic minority groups, we see there is little difference in the likelihood of respondents to see themselves as ‘British’, though one group is noticeably less likely to prioritise this identifier: just 32% of Black African respondents place ‘British’ in their top three choices, compared to an average of 48% among all other ethnic groups.

Black respondents, particularly those of Black African heritage, are less likely than other ethnic minorities to identify as British

Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as.... British?



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, Ethnic minority survey, 2023

Ethnic minority Christians also tend to be less likely to choose 'British' than other religious groups. Just 39% of non-white Christians say they see themselves as British, lower than the comparative figures for white Christians (64%) Hindus (45%), Muslims (48%) and Sikhs (53%), non-religious ethnic minorities (52%) and white respondents (62%).

Considering that a large portion of the Black African and Caribbean community in our survey is of Christian faith (69% of Black Africans in our survey identify as Christian, as do 73% of Black Caribbeans), this could be an instance of religion interacting with ethnicity.

Overall, it seems that there is more variation between ethnic groups in the likelihood to identify as British than there is between those who are white and non-white. However, there does seem to be a stronger link between the strength of national identity and voting behaviour among the white population than the ethnic minority population.

ETHNIC IDENTITY

Throughout this report we contrast the responses of our respondents based on their ethnicity, given the divergence in voting patterns between white and non-white respondents. Perhaps the most obvious reason for this variation may be that ethnicity and being a member of an ethnic group is more important to ethnic minority respondents' identities than for those who are white, which leads both groups to vote in distinct ways.


Among the white population very few respondents say that being a member of an ethnic group is an important part of their identity: just 6% say so, with fewer than 1% of white respondents saying this is the most important part of their identity.

Ethnicity is more important to the identities of ethnic minority respondents. Some 37% of non-white respondents say they see themselves as part of an ethnic group. For 9%, this is the most significant part of their identity. However, the importance of ethnicity varies significantly by ethnic subgroup.

Among British Caribbeans, over half (53%) of respondents say they identify as part of an ethnic group, with 14% ranking this identifier first. Respondents belonging to those ethnic groups most likely to have voted Conservative in 2019 (namely British Chinese and Indian participants) are the least likely to see themselves as part of an ethnic group, while the groups most likely to emphasise ethnic identity strongly supported Labour in 2019.

Respondents of Black Caribbean heritage are the most likely to say they think of themselves as part of an ethnic group

Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as... a member of your ethnic group? (% selecting this as an option)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Generation is also important in determining the importance of ethnicity to non-white respondents. First, second and third generation ethnic minorities - those whose parents, grandparents or who themselves were the first of their family to reside in the UK - are more likely to see ethnicity as a key part of their identity than later generations, and to identify it as the most important aspect of their sense of self. However, there is no clear relationship between generation and the 2019 vote.

Although those who are non-white may be more likely than the white population to see ethnicity as an important part of their identity, the extent to which ethnicity is prioritised over other factors - or thought to be important at all - varies between different ethnic groups and seems to be more important to the political identity of some than others.

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

There is a particular distinction between white and non-white respondents when it comes to the importance of religion to their identity. Just 6% of the white population says that being part of a religious community is important to how they see themselves, with 2% saying this is the most crucial element of their identity. The latter sentiment is heavily concentrated among those who identify as 'very' religious.

In contrast, 28% of ethnic minority respondents identify as part of a religious community, with 8% saying this is the most important facet of their identity. This is unsurprising given the higher overall level of religiosity among our non-white respondents'; while 61% of white respondents would class themselves as 'not at all religious', just 20% of ethnic minorities say the same. Indeed, 26% would class themselves as 'very religious', compared to just 5% of the white population.

Although the importance of religion tends to be concentrated among those white respondents who are either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ religious, this is not as marked as among the non-white population. In addition, among our ethnic minority sample, those aged 18-24 are the most likely to say that being part of a religious community is the most important part of their identity. Religiosity is much higher among young non-white respondents than white ones of the same age.

We also see far more diversity in religious identification among ethnic minorities, with significant numbers of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim respondents. We also see many ethnic minority respondents identifying as Buddhist or Jewish, though the size of the groups in our sample is not large enough to draw conclusions from. For the same reasons, the only religious group of significance among white respondents is Christianity.


Comparing non-white Christians to our white group, we see that ethnic minority Christians are more likely to see themselves as ‘part of a religious community’ (28% vs 10%), though neither group is particularly likely to say this is the most important facet of their identity.

Non-white Muslims are the ethno-religious group most likely to see religion as a fundamental part of their identity; some 37% identify as part of a religious community (particularly those who say they are somewhat or very religious). Around 12% of Muslim respondents indeed see their religion as the most important part of their identity.

Indeed, when breaking down responses by ethnic group, those with large Muslim populations (namely our Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups) are most likely to say that being part of a religious community is important to their sense of self. We also see that being part of a religious community is particularly important to Black African respondents, a large number of whom identify as Christian.

Being part of a religious community tends to be more important to non-white respondents than those who are white

Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as... a member of your religious community? (% selecting this as an option)




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Some of these groups - British Muslims, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis - were among the most likely to say they voted Labour in 2019. This suggests that among ethnic minorities - for whom religiosity is generally higher overall - religious identity is correlated with Labour support. Indeed, we see that those ethnic minorities who see themselves as part of a religious community were more likely to vote Labour in 2019 than any other party. Yet among the white population, we see no such tie.

Being part of a religious community is particularly important to the identity of non-white British Muslims

Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as... a member of your religious community? (% selecting this as an option, % choosing this as their top choice indicated by darker colour)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority sample survey, 2023. Bars not stacked but overlaid. Dark colour is percentage that ranked it as top choice.

OCCUPATIONAL AND CLASS IDENTITIES

Class was [consistently a foundation](#) of political behaviour and social dynamics in Britain for decades, with electoral and social alignments deeply connected to an individual’s occupation, background, and education. In recent years, these ties have weakened. Since the late 1990s, class dealignment has taken place, with voters no longer voting simply as their class would suggest. We were therefore keen to see how important class now is to Britons and their sense of identity, and if this could lie behind Labour’s dominance of the non-white vote.

Very few Britons say their economic class is an important part of their identity: just 11% of our respondents place this among their top three responses. This does not vary with income or education level among the general population. Young people tend to be somewhat more likely to identify with, and give priority to, their class status than older respondents, but this difference is relatively small.


Respondents are, however, more likely to focus on their occupation or work as part of their identity. 26% say they see themselves as a member of their profession, though few say this is the most important element of their sense of self. This tendency is more common among younger voters, as well as those with the equivalent of degree-level education or above.

Non-white respondents tend to be more likely to identify as a member of an economic or professional class than those who are white. An average of 16% of ethnic minority respondents see themselves as a ‘member of an economic class’, and 30% through ‘the prism of your work and profession’. The equivalent figures for the white population are 10% and 24%.

The importance of these economic factors to ethnic minority voters could underpin the strength of Labour’s support among this group. However, as the chart shows, when we break down our results by ethnic subgroup, we see that those groups most likely to have voted Labour in 2019 are some of the least likely to say they see themselves through the prism of class or profession.

Class and professional identities tend to be more important to ethnic minority respondents than those who are white

Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as... an economic class/as your work or profession? (% selecting this as an option)




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

We are interested to see if the importance of class and profession to respondents’ sense of self varies depending on how long they or their families have resided in Britain. Given class has been seen as such an important part of British society, we thought that we may see a contrast in the responses of those who had not been brought up here, or whose closest relatives had not been, and those who have.

We do indeed see that class and profession tend to be more important to the identity of those respondents who were not born in Britain. Though the importance of class to the identity of those born in the UK, and those who have resided here for a number of years may have waned, this is not the case for newer migrants and those whose families have more recently migrated to Britain- this seems to be more important to the salience of class and professional identity than ethnic subgroup.

Class and professional identities tend to be most important to first generation ethnic minority respondents

Generally speaking, do you tend to think of yourself as... an economic class/as your work or profession? (% selecting this as an option)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

BEING ‘BRITISH’

Many respondents see their national identity as an important part of their sense of self. A significant number of both white and non-white respondents choose ‘British’ as one of their three most important identifiers. Yet we did see that ethnic minorities do not tend to prioritise national identity as part of their sense of self to the same extent as those who are white.

Here, we look at whether this translates into different attitudes toward what it means to be ‘British’, and how conceptualisations vary between groups based on factors such as age, race, and progressivism. We ask about respondents’ views of national institutions, what makes them most proud to live in Britain, and what they think makes a person ‘truly British’.

In particular, we are interested to see how narrow respondents’ conceptualisation of ‘Britishness’ is, and how much different groups ‘gatekeep’ what it is to be British, using more strict conceptions based around race, religion and ancestry. It could be these strict conceptualisations of ‘Britishness’ which prevent some ethnic minorities from seeing themselves as such.

We find that:

- The public have an open approach to what ‘Britishness’ is, with few believing that being white, Christian, or having British ancestry is important. Instead, respondents think it is more important to appreciate British institutions, laws and culture, and contribute through work and paying taxes.
- Ethnic minority respondents tend to share this ‘open’ approach to British identity, with few feeling excluded on the basis of their race or religion. However, we find that ethnic minority respondents tend to become more ‘exclusionary’ in their approach (defining being ‘British’ in ethnic or religious terms) the longer back they can trace their own family’s British heritage.
- Britons are particularly proud of the NHS and the UK’s educational institutions, with little difference in warmth felt toward most national institutions by the white and ethnic minority populations.
- The public would feel most proud to live in a country with good healthcare, provisions to raise a family, and which provides a chance for its citizens to ‘get on’ in life. This vision is shared by ethnic minorities, albeit with more emphasis on Britain being diverse and tolerant of different cultures, particularly in comparison to older, white respondents with a below-degree level education.

BEING 'TRULY BRITISH'

To look into respondents' views of national identity and its links to demographic factors like race, religion and ancestry, participants were presented with a list of characteristics and asked which three they considered most important for being 'truly British'.


Overall, Britons are quite liberal when it comes to defining what it is to be British, which may explain why just so many respondents felt able to describe themselves in this way in the earlier questions on identity. Just 8% of Britons (including 8% of the white population) say that being white is important to being British, with just 5% of ethnic minority respondents feeling excluded on this basis.

For most people, being British is more about appreciating British institutions (38%) and culture (41%), and contributing in some way to society, for instance by working and paying taxes (42%). These are more important than demographic or citizenship requirements: 22% say being born in Britain is 'truly important' for being British, while 17% cite British ancestry and 11% say having British parents.

Both white and ethnic minority respondents hold relatively 'open' views of what it is to be British, placing little emphasis on race, religion or ancestry. White respondents are more likely to say that it is important to have British ancestry to be considered 'truly British' (18% to 10%), but less likely to say that having British citizenship is important than ethnic minorities (22% to 33%), placing emphasis on more 'informal' requirements such as respecting British culture, working here and paying taxes.

Few people think you have to be white, Christian or have British ancestry to be considered 'truly British'

Some people say the following things are important for being 'truly British'. Which of the following do you think is most important? Please select up to three.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Among the white population, we generally see little variation in what it means to be British between age groups. Younger respondents are, however, much less likely to think that people should have to respect British political institutions or work and pay taxes in Britain or have British ancestry to be British. Education, however, does have an impact; those white respondents without a degree-level education tend to hold a more restrictive view of what it means to be British, being more likely than those with a degree or above to say it is important to have been born in Britain, have British ancestry, and - though to a lesser extent - have citizenship.


Age also has a minimal effect among ethnic minority respondents. There is little variation in the attributes thought to be important to being 'truly British' between age brackets, though (like white respondents) younger non-white participants place less emphasis on respecting political institutions or paying taxes in the UK.

The impact of education is smaller among ethnic minorities, with little difference in responses between those with or without a degree. However, we do see that those with a degree tend to place (slightly) more emphasis on attributes like having British ancestry or being born in Britain. Unlike the white population, where a higher education level is linked to a more 'open' approach to Britishness, here, it is linked to a more restrictive one.

There are two other interesting trends among ethnic minority respondents. First is the diversity in terms of what is thought to be necessary to be 'truly British' among different ethnic groups. Few in any ethnic group feel excluded on the basis of their ethnicity. However, some respondents have more conservative views of who can be considered 'truly British'. British Black African respondents tend to be more focused on 'formal requirements' like having citizenship and paying taxes in the UK, as well as other factors like ancestry, having a parent born in the UK, and being Christian (which a large portion of this group is). Others place more emphasis on ideas like appreciating British culture or simply just considering oneself to be British.

Ethnic minority respondents vary in the importance they place on citizenship and paying taxes to being 'truly British'

Some people say the following things are important for being 'truly British'. Which of the following do you think is most important? Please select up to three.




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority survey, 2023

Second is the influence of generation on respondents' views. Those who are or were the first in their family to reside in Britain tend to have more 'open' views of British identity. They place more emphasis on issues like respect for institutions or contributing via work and tax than those from later generations. The latter tend to be more likely to say it is important to have been born here, have British ancestry, or be white, even if they are not. In other words, ethnic minority respondents tend to become more exclusionary the further back they can trace their family's British heritage.

This may be because they are more likely to meet some of these requirements - having British ancestry and being born in Britain. Or it may be because they themselves have experienced discrimination or been made to feel they are not truly British, and so are reflecting what they believe wider public opinion to be. The experience of racism and discrimination among ethnic minority Britons is something we go on to examine in the next chapter.

Later generations of ethnic minorities tend to become more exclusionary in their approach to 'Britishness'

Some people say the following things are important for being 'truly British'. Which of the following do you think is most important? Please select up to three.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority survey, 2023

VIEWS OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Previous [research has shown](#) that national institutions, and how people relate to them, are important in developing a sense of national identity. As a first step toward understanding respondents' sense of 'Britishness', we look at the cultural and political institutions respondents identify with and value the most. Respondents were presented with several institutions and asked to give them a score between 0-100 based on their opinion of them (0 means a completely unfavourable view while 100 means very favourable).


The most prized institution among the public overall is the NHS, followed by the British education system. The government is the most negatively viewed of all the choices presented to respondents, though it is worth highlighting that respondents show an appreciation for democracy: 61% think having a liberal democracy with regular elections is better than having a strong leader who does not engage with the democratic system.

Nor is there much difference in warmth toward institutions between the white and non-white population - although the ethnic minority population has a slightly less favourable view of the monarchy, and greater appreciation for places of worship. The latter is probably linked to the generally higher levels of religiosity we see among non-white respondents, with this sentiment concentrated among those ethnic minority respondents identifying as somewhat/very religious.

Otherwise, there appears to be little difference in attitudes toward national institutions between the white and non-white populations.

There are few differences in the attitudes toward British institutions held by white and non white voters

Below is a list of prominent institutions and movements in the UK. For each, please say on a scale from 0 to 10 whether you have a favourable or unfavourable view of them, where 0 is very unfavourable and 100 is very favourable.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Where we see real differentiation between white and non-white respondents is in the influence of demographic factors, like age and education, upon views of national institutions. While attitudes toward national institutions vary quite significantly among the white population based on age and education level, this is not the case for the ethnic minority population.


Among the white population, younger people tend to be less positive about ‘traditional’ institutions like the monarchy or commonwealth, and more positive about ‘cultural institutions’ like the BBC and the education system, as well as places of worship. However, the pattern is less clear among the ethnic minority population. Here, younger people are also somewhat negative about the monarchy and the police but they are also less positive about the education system. As among the white population, young ethnic minorities are very positive about places of worship.

Meanwhile, among the white population we see that graduates tend to be more positive about ‘cultural’ institutions, such as the BBC, education system and places of worship, though not necessarily more negative toward traditional institutions. Among ethnic minorities, however, education is linked to an increased level of pride in all the national institutions we ask about.

Black African respondents tend to be the most positive about national institutions, despite being the ethnic group least likely to identify as British



Below is a list of prominent institutions and movements in the UK. For each, please say on a scale from 0 to 10 whether you have a favourable or unfavourable view of them, where 0 is very unfavourable and 100 is very favourable.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, Ethnic minority survey, 2023

When we break down responses by ethnic group, we do see some variation between subgroups in their views. One striking finding is that Black African voters tend to be the most positive of all ethnic groups about all institutions (aside from places of worship, where they are the second most positive). This is despite this same group being one of the least likely to identify as ‘British’ in our question on identity in section three, perhaps suggesting their conception of British identity is detached from their feelings toward state institutions.

Meanwhile, Black Caribbean voters tend to be among the least favourable toward many ‘traditional’ institutions - particularly the Home Office, police and Government. We did see earlier that Black Caribbean respondents were among the least likely to say that being ‘British’ was an important part of their identities, which could translate into lower scores toward these entities.

British Indian and Chinese respondents are particularly positive about the UK government (which, at the time of asking, was the Conservative Government led by Rishi Sunak). Though these groups were not necessarily more likely to identify as ‘British’ than other ethnic groups, they are the most likely to say they voted Conservative in 2019, which could explain this higher score. However, we also see that respondents in these two groups tend to be more favourable toward other ‘traditional’ institutions such as the Monarchy, Commonwealth and police.

THE FUTURE OF THE UK AND NATIONAL PRIDE


We also asked respondents about the future of the UK, and the type of country they would be most proud to live in, presenting them with a list of different visions for the future of Britain. We asked them to select the three that were most appealing.

The warmth toward the British healthcare system we saw in the previous question is reiterated here. Most respondents say they would be proud to live in the UK if it was the best place to access good quality healthcare, with 61% of all respondents choosing this as one of their three options. This is followed by Britain being ‘the best place to raise a family’, with 51% of respondents choosing this response, and ‘the best place to get on in life and improve one’s lot’ at 41%. There is clearly a sense that Britons not only want to live in a country where they are well cared for, but one where there is equal opportunity for all, and which is meritocratic.

A high number of respondents (40%) also say that they would be proud to live in a Britain which is a ‘multicultural, diverse society where people embrace each other’s differences’.

The British people would be proud to live in a country with good a good healthcare system, which was a good place to raise a family, and which is diverse

Thinking about different visions for the future of the country, which of the following would make you most proud to live in the UK? Please select up to three.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

In some respects, we see little difference in priorities between ethnic minorities and the white population. A Britain with a good quality healthcare system (52%), which is a good place to raise a family (39%), and which is the best place to get on in life (34%) are some of the most popular visions for the future among both white and non-white respondents.

However, ethnic minority Britons are more likely than those who are white to say they would be most proud to live in a country that is diverse and multicultural. 54% of ethnic minority respondents choose this option, a larger percentage than we see among those who are white (39%). This is a particular priority among ethnic minorities who were/are the first generation of their family to live in the UK and those above 55.

We do not see much variation within the white population based on either age or education. A majority of every age group in our white sample says they would be most proud to live in a country that was the best place to access healthcare. Older white people tend to be more concerned with the UK being the best place to raise a family and access healthcare and the best place to 'get on in life' than their younger counterparts, but as older people are more likely to have families of their own and experience health issues, this tendency may simply be linked to life experience.

The only option where we see a marked difference between graduates and non-graduates is on multiculturalism; white respondents with a degree or above are much more likely to say they would be proud to live in a multicultural, diverse society than those without (48% versus 35%).


Among the ethnic minority population, the United Kingdom having a high-quality health service invokes a high level of pride among all age groups. The idea of a multicultural and diverse Britain is also very popular. There is very little difference in the number of respondents who say the UK being diverse would make them proud to live here between age or educational groups, in contrast to the split we see among the white population.

Some ethnic minority subgroups value the UK’s material success - being a good place to grow a business or ‘get on’ in life, or doing well in university rankings - more so than others. These are particularly popular responses among British Black African, Indian and Chinese respondents. Indeed, when we asked these groups about their political values and priorities, we saw they were particularly likely to say a government should focus on economic growth and stability, which could explain this preference.

Yet these differences are small, and overall there is little contrast between subgroups, with all indicating they would be most proud to live in a diverse and multicultural country, with a strong emphasis on good healthcare and family. So there is little cheer for the Conservatives here.

Ethnic minority respondents share similar views on which vision of Britain would make them most proud, no matter their ethnic group

Thinking about different visions for the future of the country, which of the following would make you most proud to live in the UK? Please select up to three.




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority survey, 2023

How does an individual’s hopes for the country’s future affect how they vote? Among the white population, there is a clear link between 2019 vote choice and aspirations for the UK’s future. Those who say they would be most proud to live in a country that is multicultural and diverse, the best place to access healthcare, and a global leader on the environment are all more likely to say they voted Labour in 2019. Meanwhile, those who said they would be most proud to live in a country that is the best place to start and grow a business, or the best place to get on in life, all leaned Conservative.

We do not find such a consistent pattern among the ethnic minority population, where differences based on the 2019 vote are much smaller. This could suggest that aspirations for the future of the country do not necessarily affect ethnic minorities' vote intention in the same way. However it's worth noting that of those who selected 'a multicultural diverse society' as one of their three choices, more of them had voted Labour (58%) than Conservative (50%).

The fact that this aspiration tends to be more prominent among ethnic minorities overall could explain some of Labour's dominance among the non-white population.

Voters who would be proud if Britain was a multicultural country are more likely to have voted Labour in 2019 than Conservative **UK IN A CHANGING EUROPE**
Thinking about different visions for the future of the country, which of the following would make you most proud to live in the UK? Please select up to three. **FOCALDATA**



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Overall, then, few ethnic minorities feel excluded from being 'British' on the basis of their race, ancestry, or pride in national institutions, with white and non-white respondents polling similarly. The most consistent difference seems to be a focus on multiculturalism and diversity; this is something which is a greater point of national pride for ethnic minority respondents than for those who are white.

DISCRIMINATION AND PREJUDICE

Throughout our survey we have compared the responses from the UK's white and ethnic minority populations to see how the identity, national identity and political priorities of each group varies. We have found on issues of identity there are only small differences between the two groups, though important intra-group differences. We now turn our attention to how these groups interact, their views toward each other and the perceptions of the discrimination and barriers faced by each.

We live in a country where although the government and institutional seats of power may look more diverse than ever, there are increasing concerns around racial discrimination, online abuse, and co-existence of communities from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The summer of 2024 also saw riots and civil unrest focused around issues of immigration and asylum, with [some innocent bystanders](#) attacked solely because of the colour of their skin. Yet we also saw in our previous chapter that few ethnic minority respondents feel excluded from being 'British' on the basis of their race, religion or ancestry.

We wanted to not just assess levels of prejudice among our respondents but see how tolerant they themselves think British society is. We were interested to see how commonplace our respondents think instances of discrimination and abuse are, looking at any difference between ethnic minority and white respondents on this measure.

Our responses indicate that:

- The British public is broadly tolerant of minority groups, though there are a material number of respondents who express more negative views toward welfare claimants, students, and LGBTQ+ people. A small, hardcore group also expresses racist views.
- The (relatively small) degree of prejudice is broadly similar between minority groups and those who are white. However, specific ethno-religious groups hold more negative attitudes toward some select groups, such as LGBTQ+ people.
- Those who are younger and degree-educated are more likely to say race relations in the UK are poor than other respondents. They are also more likely to say that instances of racism and discrimination have become more common in recent years.

- The idea that white people face some discrimination is relatively popular among white respondents, particularly for older non-graduates.
- Ethnic minority respondents who believe that race relations have gotten worse in recent years are not more likely to vote for a left-wing party than those who do not agree. White respondents appear to be more likely to vote for a left-wing party if they think racism has gotten worse, but when we control for other factors upon vote choice, this relationship is not statistically significant.


PREJUDICE

As a starting point, our respondents indicate little explicit prejudice toward other minority groups. Asking which, if any, minority or disadvantaged groups they would feel uncomfortable living alongside, we see that there are few which a significant portion express any objection to. There are just two groups for whom there is significant opposition to the idea of having them as neighbours- heavy drinkers and students. This suggests that, for the most part, the general public is relatively accepting and open to the idea of mixing and sharing space with individuals from a variety of cultures and backgrounds, with small variations across age groups and education levels.

That being said, Britain is still a country with a core of radically prejudiced voters of around 5-10%, varying depending on the minority group in question. For example, 10% of people say they would not like to live next door to a homosexual couple, and 5% say they would not like to live alongside someone of a different race.

Overall, few respondents would feel uncomfortable living with people of a different race, sexuality or who speak a different language

Please look at the list of people below. Please indicate any which you would not like to have as a neighbour.




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

There are few differences in the views of white and ethnic minority respondents, though the latter are more likely to object to the idea of having a gay couple as a neighbour. Religiosity seems to be a predictor of this trend among both white and non-white respondents, with those who are ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ religious more likely to say they would not want to have a homosexual couple as neighbours than those who are less religious. As we see in section three, ethnic minority respondents are more likely to identify as religious overall than those who are white.

Among the white population there is some small variation between age or educational brackets in the number of respondents who say they would feel comfortable living next to any group. Among the ethnic minority population, this variation is more significant; younger ethnic minority respondents tend to be more comfortable living next to any group than those who are older. 18% of non-white respondents aged 18-24 say they would be comfortable living alongside any of the groups we put to them, while the comparable figure for non-white respondents aged 65 and above is 36%

Young ethnic minority respondents are less likely than others to say they would feel comfortable living alongside any group

Please look at the list of people below. Please indicate any which you would not like to have as a neighbour (% saying 'I would be comfortable with any of these as a neighbour')



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023


We see few consistent differences in the responses of ethnic minority subgroups - there does not seem to be any ethnic group that takes an overall more conservative or liberal position toward marginalised communities, though Black and Mixed Race respondents are more likely than other ethnic minorities to say they would feel comfortable living next to any group.

Instead, what we see is that specific ethnic groups seem to hold more negative attitudes toward specific communities. For example, British Chinese respondents are more likely than those in other ethnic groups to object to living next door to someone on benefits. Meanwhile, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and ethnic minority Muslim respondents are more likely than other ethnic minority groups to say that they would not like to live next door to a same-sex couple. However, we do also see

that these groups are among the most likely of all ethnic minorities to say they are either somewhat or very religious, suggesting that attitudes on this issue are again driven by religiosity.

Black respondents are more likely than other ethnic minorities to say they would feel comfortable living with any group

Please look at the list of people below. Please indicate any which you would not like to have as a neighbour.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority survey, 2023

DISCRIMINATION


The responses above indicate that though overall we see relatively high levels of tolerance toward most groups, specific groups hold more negative views about particular sections of the population.

We were interested to see which groups our respondents perceive to be the most likely to face discrimination, and how much this perception varies. For example, are white voters unaware of the extent to which non-white voters feel discriminated against?

Overall, the British public is in broad agreement that some groups face discrimination more than others. We see broad agreement between white and ethnic minority voters that black and minority ethnic, poor people, those on welfare benefits, and LGBTQ+ people all face more discrimination than white people, young people or old people.

There is broad agreement among the British public on which social groups face the most discrimination

How much discrimination is there against the following groups? Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means 'none at all' and 10 means 'a significant amount'.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023


Younger, university-educated people are more likely to say that every social group faces a high level of discrimination. This could suggest that this group of respondents has a different understanding of discrimination (and what counts as it) which could lead them to think it is more pervasive.

Looking at discrimination against ethnic minorities specifically, we see that younger people- both white and non-white- are more pessimistic about the amount of discrimination faced by ethnic minorities than their older counterparts, though we do not see any straightforward pattern with generation. This could suggest either that racial discrimination is experienced more often by younger voters, or maybe that older voters may have a 'higher bar' to defining racial discrimination.

It is also important to point out that respondents place a 'premium' on the discrimination faced by the group they belong to, perhaps because they are more likely to have experienced it personally. For example, those earning below the average UK wage per year, and those who are not working, are more likely to say the poor and those on welfare face discrimination than those who do. Older people say that the discrimination faced by older people is worse than younger people. And, most clearly, ethnic minority respondents believe that the scale of discrimination faced by ethnic minority people is worse than white respondents do. Similarly, white respondents are more likely than those who are non-white to say white people face some discrimination.

Respondents place a 'premium' on the discrimination faced by the ethnic group they belong to

How much discrimination is there against the following groups?: Black and minority ethnic people; white people.




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023. NB: scores 0-3 are classed as 'none at all/a small amount', 4-7 as 'some', and 8-10 as 'quite a lot/a significant amount'

For example, ethnic minority respondents are more likely than those who are white to say that ethnic minority people face a significant amount of discrimination (47% or 31%). Among ethnic minority subgroups, there is some variation in this view; some ethnic groups are more likely to think that discrimination is particularly prevalent, in particular Black Caribbean and Mixed-Race respondents.

Black respondents, particularly those of Caribbean heritage, are more likely to say ethnic minorities face significant amounts of discrimination than other respondents

How much discrimination is there against the following groups?: Black and minority ethnic people; white people.



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority survey, 2023. (NB: scores 0-3 are classed as 'none at all/a small amount', 4-7 as 'some', and 8-10 as 'quite a lot/a significant amount')

Meanwhile, 62% of ethnic minorities say there is no or little discrimination against white people. However, there is some variation in this figure between ethnic minority subgroups; while Black African and Caribbean are more adamant that white people face little to no discrimination, Bangladeshi and Chinese respondents are more sympathetic to the idea.

On the other hand, over half of white respondents think white people face at least some discrimination. This view is more common among older respondents and those with a below-degree level education.


THE STATE OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE UK

It is clear that many do feel that discrimination toward non-white people is a common occurrence. As shown above, 47% of ethnic minority respondents and 31% of white respondents believe non-white people face a significant amount of discrimination. Yet simultaneously, we see that the outlook of ethnic minorities on the success of non-white Britons, their place in society, and diversity within British institutions, is not wholly negative.

A majority of both ethnic minority and white respondents agreed that Britain is a 'great example of a multiracial democracy'. This was a view widely shared among respondents across all ages, education and ethnicities.

Over half of respondents say Britain is a great example of a multiracial democracy. However, a significant number of ethnic minorities also think race relations are poor.

*To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
(% somewhat agree/strongly agree)*



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

We also see an appreciation for the values of ethnic minority Britons; 66% of ethnic minorities and 55% of white respondents agree that such values are ones Britain increasingly needs.

We also see an appreciation for the increased diversity at the top of British institutions in recent years. At the time of our survey, the UK had its first Prime Minister from an ethnic minority background in Rishi Sunak; it had recently seen the most diverse Cabinet in history under former Prime Minister Boris Johnson; and it had a significant number of MPs from an ethnic minority background.

More than a third of ethnic minority respondents say that they have become more likely to see people who look like them in a position of power, in particular British Indians and Bangladeshis and those belonging to earlier generations of ethnic


minority families. 51% of ethnic minority respondents say that this diversity at the top of the British government is a good thing.

Yet despite this initial positivity, there are still clearly areas of contention. More than a third of white respondents, and 42% of ethnic minority respondents, say that race relations are generally poor. We see this sentiment concentrated particularly among Black respondents, in particular British Caribbeans, who are also among the most likely to say that their ethnic background has made it more difficult to get ahead of any ethnic group.

This cannot be viewed in isolation from the fact that this same ethnic group was particularly likely to say discrimination against ethnic minorities is commonplace.

Black respondents, particularly of Caribbean descent, are the most likely to say race relations in the UK are poor.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (% somewhat agree/strongly agree)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority survey, 2023

To get an idea of why respondents were likely to say race relations were poor, we decided to delve deeper into different groups' perceptions of discrimination, how it manifests itself, and how the prevalence of such behaviour has changed over time.


We see that though there is a view among many respondents that some ethnic minority groups have started to do extremely well, it's still the case that almost a third of non-white respondents agree that their ethnic background has made it more difficult for them to get ahead in life, in comparison to 10% of white respondents.

We also see that in many cases, ethnic minority respondents say that instances of abject racism have become more common, or at least stayed at a consistent level in the last five years. 29% of ethnic minority respondents say they think the expression of racist views offline has become more common, with 21% saying the use of racial slurs or jokes has increased. A similar number of white respondents express the same views.

Online abuse is the form of racism which our respondents say has increased most; 39% of ethnic minority respondents say that the expression of racist views on the internet has become more common in the last five years. Again, British Caribbean respondents are particularly likely to express this view in comparison to those belonging to other ethnic minority groups. This is a phenomenon which the white population is aware of, with a third of this group agreeing online racism has become more common, while 14% of white respondents believe instances of this have decreased.

Over a third of ethnic minorities say they have seen online racial abuse increase over the last five years

Would you say the following scenarios occur more or less now compared to 5 years ago?




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Meanwhile, though some ethnic minority respondents are less likely to say that racial abuse has become more common in recent times, we find they feel ‘culturally excluded’ - less likely to see people like themselves on television or in positions of authority within society. Take, for example, British Chinese respondents. Of all our ethnic minority groups, this group is the least likely to say that in-person racial abuse has become more common (20% say so) and among the least likely to say online abuse has. A third of British Chinese respondents actually say online racial abuse has become less common over the last five years.

Yet this group is the least likely to say they see more people like themselves on television (20%), and in positions of power (14%). British Caribbean respondents, however, are very likely to say that they have increasingly seen themselves represented in society and on screen.

Black Caribbean respondents are particularly likely to say they have seen an increase in racial abuse in recent years

Would you say the following scenarios occur more or less now compared to 5 years ago? (% saying more now)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority survey, 2023

Many ethnic minority respondents, then, believe that race relations in the UK are poor, and that explicit racist abuse and comments have become more commonplace (or at least no less common) over the last five years. Yet some core groups are consistently more pessimistic than their peers.


First, Black Caribbean respondents. As above, these respondents are more likely to say that discrimination against ethnic minority people occurs at a significant rate, that overall race relations are poor, and that instances of offline and online racist abuse have increased in the last five years. However, this group is also among the most likely to say they started to see more people who look like them on television and in positions of power in recent years and are one of the ethnic groups least likely to say they have more commonly been subject to racial abuse in recent years.

Second is young ethnic minority respondents. It is worth pointing out that this is a group that does see Britain's increased diversity as a good thing, has noticed the increased prominence of non-white people in positions of power, and is among the least likely to say race relations are poor.

However, they are also less likely than their peers to say certain minority groups are doing better than the white population, that diversity at the top of government is a good thing, and that Britain is a good example of a multiracial democracy.

Younger ethnic minority respondents are less likely to think race relations are poor, but are also less positive about Britain as a multiracial democracy

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Net % Agree, ethnic minority respondents)




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, ethnic minority survey, 2023

Third are young, white graduates. This group was more likely than other respondents to say that there was significant discrimination against all the marginalised groups we asked about earlier. Here, we see that younger white respondents and white graduates are more likely than those who are older to say race relations are worse, that instances of racial abuse are more common, and are less likely to say certain ethnic groups are doing just as well as the white population.

Younger white respondents are more likely than older ones to say instances of racist abuse have become more common

Would you say the following scenarios occur more or less now compared to 5 years ago? (Net % Lead for 'more now' over 'less now', white)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative survey, 2023

Our descriptive data indicates that, when breaking down responses among the ethnic minority and white populations by voting history, those voting for left-wing parties tend to be more likely to agree that race relations in the UK have worsened than those voting for right-wing parties. This could suggest that a perceived or actual increase in racism and discrimination is a politically sensitive issue that impacts voting patterns both within the ethnic minority and white populations.


However, when looking at how much more (un)common ethnic minority respondents think instances of overt racism against them are compared to five years ago, we see a different story. We see that, regardless of whether they think instances of racism have become less common, ethnic minorities remain consistently likely to vote for a left-wing party. When controlling for other influences on vote choice, we also see that the difference in the likelihood of voting for a left-wing party between those white respondents who are most pessimistic and optimistic about racial progress is not statistically significant.

This suggests that views of race relations, or opinions on how much more or less tolerant Britain has become on race, do not factor into the voting patterns of white or non-white respondents.

Regardless of whether they think instances of racism have become more or less common, ethnic minorities remain consistently likely to vote for a left-wing party



Would you say the following scenarios occur more or less now compared to five years ago: people expressing racist or racially insensitive views online/offline, seeing people who look like me on TV, seeing people who look like me in positions of power, people acting suspicious of me, being subject to racial slurs or jokes/ Imagine there was a UK General Election tomorrow. Which party would you vote for?



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023. A 'racial optimism' index has been created for this model based on the more/less question above, Higher values indicate respondents are more optimistic/believe things have improved. The details of this model can be found in the Appendix.

ECONOMIC PREFERENCES AND SOCIAL VALUES

In our attempt to understand the diverging vote patterns of the UK's ethnic minority and white populations we have looked at how the views, experiences and identities of these two groups differ. We have seen that, for the most part, the two share similar political values and policy priorities. There are, however, important differences. For example, economic competence and management are more important to the vote patterns of some ethnic groups than others. And factors like class, work, and religion tend to be more important to ethnic minorities than those who are white.

These differences could indicate some difference in values between the ethnic minority and white population. Yet it is not exactly clear on what axis these differences lie (whether they are economic or social preferences), nor how substantial they are. To delve into this question, we asked respondents a set of questions on their social and economic values. We were interested in whether Britons skew left or right in their preferences, and whether ethnic minorities- and any ethnic minority groups in particular- demonstrate more liberal or authoritarian tendencies.

We start by looking at economic values. We saw earlier that economic and professional class identities were more important to ethnic minorities than those who are white. However, those ethnic groups most likely to have voted Labour in 2019 are some of the least likely to say they see themselves through the prism of class or profession. This might suggest that, for ethnic minority voters, economic preferences are not necessarily tied to voting intention.

To begin, we look at economic values. We find that:

- Ethnic minority and white Britons are relatively united in their economic values, in particular when it comes to the influence of external factors on individuals' life chances, and the importance of economic growth versus equitable redistribution of wealth. However, these views are influenced by demographic factors such as age and education.
- Ethnic minorities are more likely, however, to take left-leaning economic positions than those who are white. However, this is conditioned by education, which has the opposite impact on economic preferences as we see among the white population; ethnic minority respondents with a degree-level education tend to hold more conservative economic views than those without.

- Some ethnic minority groups hold more right-wing economic views than others, in particular British Chinese and Indians, specifically Indian Hindus. These were the groups that were most likely to say they voted Conservative in 2019, suggesting economic values do impact the vote choice of ethnic minority voters.

ECONOMIC PREFERENCES

When asked about their economic preferences and values, we see that whilst many Britons believe in the idea of meritocracy and would rather a government focus on economic growth than other issues, a significant portion also believe that individuals should be able to access government support where they need it. We see that public opinion is more cohesive on the former questions than the latter; on questions around support for the redistribution of income or and benefits, public opinion is relatively split.

Our responses suggest that the public does value the idea that there is a link between individual effort and economic status. In our nationally representative survey, 59% of people say that a person's position in society is down to the individual over wider structural factors (31%). A majority of voters also say that the government should focus on growing the size of the economy over making wealth distribution more equal (52%:38%).


On our other two economic indicators, we did not see such a consensus in the general population's pattern of responses. For example, when asked specifically if the government should have the power to redistribute income, respondents marginally say they should not, though this lead is slim (48% to 43%). The public is also divided on the availability of benefits; though a majority (52%) say that those who are struggling should be able to access government support, 43% argue that government benefits are too readily available.

Comparing the economic preferences of white and non-white respondents, we do see similarities. For example, as among the white population, most ethnic minority respondents agree that social status is linked to individual effort (56%:32% among ethnic minorities and 59%:31% for the white population), and that government support should be there for those in need.

However, overall, it seems that ethnic minorities are slightly more left-leaning in their economic preferences than those who are white. We see that, unlike the white population, ethnic minorities are more likely to say the government should redistribute income than it should not. We also see less support for the idea that welfare benefits are too readily available, and stronger support for sharing wealth more equally.

Ethnic minority voters tend to lean more to the left on economic values than white voters

Which of these statements do you agree with the most, even if you don't agree with either entirely? (Excludes don't knows)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

Among the white population, demographic factors impact responses. First, age. Younger white respondents commonly opt for the more left-leaning economic propositions we present. For example, though a sizable portion of younger white voters agree that a person's position in society is down to individual effort, they are less likely to believe so than older respondents. An average of 48% of white respondents aged 18-34 opt for the individual effort response, compared to 64% of those aged 55 and older.

This finding is also particularly interesting given [previous polling](#) has shown that older respondents are among the most likely to say that circumstances beyond their control have affected their life outcomes.

Younger white voters are similarly more likely to say the government should focus on sharing wealth more equally rather than growing the economy, and that those who are struggling have a right to seek help from the government, than those who are older. We see a similar pattern among ethnic minorities, with young non-white respondents more likely to take left-leaning economic positions than those who are older.

The second conditioning factor among the white population is education. As education level increases, white respondents become more likely to take left-leaning positions on the two questions referenced above. For example, white respondents with a degree-level education are more likely to be sympathetic to the influence of structural factors on social status than those without. This


pattern also applies to the growth v redistribution question (white graduates are more likely to say the government should focus on redistributive policy as opposed to economic growth), and question on benefits (more likely to say people have the right to seek help).

However, among ethnic minorities, education has the opposite impact on response patterns than it does on white respondents. Ethnic minority respondents with a degree-level education tend to opt for the more conservative response to our propositions, and have more right-wing economic preferences overall, even when we control for the influence of income. For example, non-white graduates are more likely than those without a degree to say that individual status is linked to individual effort, that the government should not redistribute income, that benefits are too readily available, and that the government should focus on economic growth over redistribution.

White graduates tend to be more economically left, while ethnic minority graduates hold more conservative economic values



Which of these statements do you agree with the most, even if you don't agree with either entirely? (Excludes don't knows)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

We now separate the responses of our ethnic minority respondents by subgroup, to see if the trend of ethnic minorities being more left leaning in their economic preferences exists beyond the aggregate level. Here, we move to using a left-right scale of overall economic preferences to do so, instead of looking at respondents'

views on individual questions. Details for how this scale was constructed can be found in the appendix.


Though overall most ethnic minority groups demonstrate left-leaning preferences on redistributive policy and the availability of welfare support for those who need it, there are more right and left-leaning factions.

Chinese, Indian and Black African respondents tend to take more right-wing economic positions. These groups are among the most likely to say that an individual's place in society is down to individual effort (60%, 62% and 65% respectively), that government should not redistribute income (54%, 47% and 47%) and that government should focus on growing the economy over redistribution (56%, 51% and 56%).

The consistency in the right-leaning economic values of these groups shows in their voting patterns; Chinese and Indian respondents were the ethnic minorities most likely to have voted Conservative in 2019.

Voters of Indian and Chinese descent tend to hold more right-wing economic views than other ethnic minority voters

The economic values of different ethnic groups: proportion of each ethnic group holding left or right-wing economic values



Source: Focaldata for UK in a Changing Europe, 2023. The Sociocultural index is made up of the following items: (1) LGBTQ+ rights have not gone far enough, or LGBTQ+ rights have gone too far; (2) People turn to crime because they have no other option and it is the only route available to better their lives, or people who commit crimes do so because they are fundamentally bad; (3) The UK should increase spending on overseas aid to other countries, or the UK should cut spending on overseas aid to other countries; Left-wing values are coded as zero, and right-wing values as one. Respondents are categorized as left-wing if they have a cumulative score of 1 or less on the index. Respondents with a score of greater than 1 are categorized as right-wing.

Though ethnic minorities may be more economically left than white respondents overall, which may in part explain their preference for the Labour Party, it is worth pointing out that certain minority groups are more economically conservative, and this is beginning to show in their vote patterns.


Religion also influences an individual's economic values; this is surprising given we might typically expect religiosity to interact more with social values.

White and non-white Christians and ethnic minority Hindus all consistently take more right-leaning economic positions than other religious groups.

There is a particular interaction with religion here among British Indians. We see that Indian Hindus are particularly right leaning, strongly in favour of growing the size of the UK's economy over sharing out wealth more equally in comparison to those British Indians who identify as Sikhs or not religious. This is a group where 2019 Conservative support was strong.

Religion has an impact on the economic preferences of white and non-white voters

The economic values of different religious groups: proportion of each group holding left or right-wing economic values (excluding 'don't know' responses)



Source: Focaldata for UK in a Changing Europe, 2023. The Economic Values index is comprised of the following items: (1) Do you think an individual's position in society is the result of their effort or elements beyond their control?; (2) Should the government focus more on growing the size of the economy or sharing out wealth more equally?; (3) People who are struggling to get by have a right to seek help from the government or people or governments benefits are too readily available people who have never contributed in return; (4) The government should redistribute income from those who are better off to those who are less well off or the government should not redistribute income as people have a right to decide what they do with their own money.

Left-wing values are coded as zero, and right-wing values as one. Respondents are categorized as left-wing if they have a cumulative score of 2 or less on the index. Respondents who have a score of 3 or 4 are categorized as right-wing

Overall, though the difference may not be large, ethnic minorities tend to hold more left-leaning economic views than those who are white. This is particularly the case for younger, non-university educated, non-white voters. This may explain the divergence in vote patterns between white people and ethnic minorities; it makes sense that those with more left-leaning economic values would be more likely to vote for a progressive party.

However, the differences between ethnic groups' economic values are starker than those between white and non-white voters. There are clear right-leaning groups of ethnic minority voters, in particular those who identify as Christian, British Indians (especially Hindus), Chinese voters, and Black African voters. These are groups where we saw an increased likelihood to vote Conservative in 2019.

SOCIAL VALUES

The above showed that there are indeed differences between white and non-white respondents on the economic axis. We now move to look at social values, to see if differences in attitudes toward issues like crime, LGBTQ+ rights and foreign aid also play a role in the political preferences of these two groups.

Responses received indicate that:


- White Britons tend to skew authoritarian in their social views, particularly for our questions on LGBTQ+ rights and foreign aid spending. Age, education, and religion are all important predictors of social liberalism among the white population.
- Ethnic minority respondents also skew authoritarian in their social views overall, but to a lesser extent than the white population. Factors like age and education all have little impact on the social views of non-white respondents.
- Being religious does not automatically mean a respondent is more socially conservative. While both white and non-white Christians and ethnic minority Muslims tend to lean socially conservative, ethnic minorities who are Hindu or Sikh tend to be more socially liberal than respondents with no religious affiliation.
- There is not as much variation between ethnic groups in their social values as there was for their economic preferences; all ethnic groups tend to lean authoritarian. However, some groups tend to take more socially conservative views on LGBTQ+ rights, crime and foreign aid than others.
- Overall, we see that while social values tend to be a good predictor of vote choice among the white population, with those with more liberal values tending to vote Labour and vice versa for the Conservatives, this pattern is not as clear among ethnic minority voters.

As for our questions on economic values, respondents were presented with two propositions- one more liberal, one more authoritarian- and asked to choose that which they most agreed with.

On most of the issues we ask about, the white population tends to lean towards authoritarian positions. On foreign aid, 67% say UK aid overseas should be cut, while 19% say it should be increased. When asked about LGBTQ+ rights, 48% of white respondents say they have gone ‘too far’, compared to the 31% who say they have not gone far enough. Opinion is more split on our crime question.

Both white and non-white voters tend to skew authoritarian on issues like LGBTQ+ rights and foreign aid

Which of these statements do you agree with the most, even if you don't agree with either entirely? (Excludes 'don't knows')



As we saw with economic values, age and education impact responses among the white population. Younger white people are significantly more likely to take more liberal social positions than those who are older, as are white graduates in comparison to those without a degree. This also applies to our questions on LGBTQ+ rights and foreign aid, though it is weaker for the latter.


Looking at our ethnic minority sample, we see that a large portion of our ethnic minority respondents also tend to hold more authoritarian social values, though this tendency is less common than we see among the white population. Ethnic minority respondents still skew authoritarian on our questions on LGBTQ+ rights and foreign aid. However, ethnic minorities are less strongly in favour of cutting overseas aid than those who are white and are more liberal on crime, suggesting they are not quite as socially authoritarian as our white sample.

A larger proportion of white voters hold authoritarian social views than non-white voters

The socio-cultural views of white and non-white voters: proportion of each ethnic group holding liberal/authoritarian social views ('Don't knows' excluded)

UK IN A
CHANGING
EUROPE

FOCALDATA



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, 2023. The Sociocultural index is made up of the following items: (1) LGBTQ+ rights have not gone far enough, or LGBTQ+ rights have gone too far; (2) People turn to crime because they have no other option and it is the only route available to better their lives, or people who commit crimes do so because they are fundamentally bad; (3) The UK should increase spending on overseas aid to other countries, or the UK should cut spending on overseas aid to other countries; Left-wing values are coded as zero, and right-wing values as one. Respondents are categorized as left-wing if they have a cumulative score of 1 or less on the index. Respondents with a score of greater than 1 are categorized as right-wing.

Furthermore, age does not have as significant an impact on the pattern of responses we see among the non-white population as it does for those who are white. While older ethnic minorities do still tend to be more likely to take conservative positions, the shift is not as stark as with the white population.


This seems to be because younger ethnic minorities are more socially conservative overall than their white counterparts. For example, on LGBTQ+ rights, an average of 50% of non-white respondents aged 44 and below say that they think these rights have gone too far, compared to 36% of white respondents of the same age. This is a pattern we find across all the social issues we ask about.

We made the point in the introduction to this section that much of our understanding about social values and how these vary among voters are based on assumptions taken from the behaviour of white voters. For example, the presumption in much academic literature that graduates tend to be more socially liberal. While this is proven to be true here for white respondents, it is not the case for ethnic minority respondents. There is little variation in liberal/authoritarian tendencies between those ethnic minorities with a degree and those without.

Earlier research suggested that religion and religiosity and social views may be intertwined, given the impact an individual's religion can have on their morals, way of life and social circles.

Education has a greater impact on the social values of white respondents than those who are not white

Difference in the support of graduates and non-graduates for the liberal propositions to our questions on LGBTQ+ rights, crime and aid spending.




Source: Focaldata for UKICE, nationally representative and ethnic minority surveys, 2023

It is not necessarily the case that respondents who are religious are automatically more socially conservative. It is true that for both the ethnic minority and white populations, Christianity is associated with holding more authoritarian social views, though white Christians are more socially conservative than ethnic minorities of the same religion (they are also older, which could be the cause of this). Muslim respondents (the majority of whom are ethnic minorities) are also particularly authoritarian on issues like LGBTQ+ rights and crime.

While Muslims and Christians tend to be more socially authoritarian than those with no religion, Hindus and Sikhs tend to be more liberal

The socio-cultural views of voters by religion: proportion of each religious group holding liberal/authoritarian social values ('Don't knows' excluded)



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, 2023. The Sociocultural index is made up of the following items: (1) LGBTQ+ rights have not gone far enough, or LGBTQ+ rights have gone too far; (2) People turn to crime because they have no other option and it is the only route available to better their lives, or people who commit crimes do so because they are fundamentally bad; (3) The UK should increase spending on overseas aid to other countries, or the UK should cut spending on overseas aid to other countries; Liberal values are coded as zero, and authoritarian values as one. Respondents are categorized as left-wing if they have a cumulative score of 1 or less on the index. Respondents with a score of greater than 1 are categorized as authoritarian.

However, in some cases, respondents with a religious affiliation are more liberal than those with no religion- for example, Sikhs and Hindus tend to be less right-wing than our respondents with no religious affiliation. The variation in the effect of religion upon social values within our samples suggests that religion has an impact on response patterns in isolation from ethnicity.


When we break down ethnic minority responses by ethnic group, we see there is not necessarily as obvious a liberal-authoritarian split between ethnic subgroups on social values as there was for economic preferences. It does appear that, for the most part, all ethnic groups do lean toward being authoritarian in their social values, albeit to a lesser extent than the white population.

All ethnic groups tend to have more respondents with authoritarian social views than liberal ones

The socio-cultural views of voters by ethnic group proportion of each ethnic group holding liberal/authoritarian social values ('Don't knows' excluded)

UK IN A CHANGING EUROPE

FOCALDATA



Source: Focaldata for UKICE, 2023. The Sociocultural index is made up of the following items: (1) LGBTQ+ rights have not gone far enough, or LGBTQ+ rights have gone too far; (2) People turn to crime because they have no other option and it is the only route available to better their lives, or people who commit crimes do so because they are fundamentally bad; (3) The UK should increase spending on overseas aid to other countries, or the UK should cut spending on overseas aid to other countries; Liberal values are coded as zero, and authoritarian values as one. Respondents are categorized as left-wing if they have a cumulative score of 1 or less on the index. Respondents with a score of greater than 1 are categorized as authoritarian.

However, the specific social views of ethnic groups tend to vary between more liberal and more authoritarian depending on the issue. As an example, Pakistani and Mixed-Race respondents tend to take more liberal views on crime but lean in very different directions on LGBTQ+ rights. Black African respondents are among the most liberal of all ethnic minorities on some social issues, and most conservative on others- you can see how this group is almost evenly divided between socially liberal and authoritarian participants in the chart above. This variation suggests that ethnic minority groups do not have as distinct social preferences as they do economic ones.

Of course, among ethnic minority respondents, religion and ethnicity do interact. For example, the more socially conservative views of Muslims on LGBTQ+ rights are likely linked to the more authoritarian view of Bangladeshi respondents overall, as on the other issues we ask about this group is quite liberal.

How authoritarian Indian respondents are in their social views also varies depending on whether they identify as Hindus or Sikhs. Indian Hindus tend to take more consistently conservative social positions than Sikhs, for example, being more likely to say that individuals commit crimes because they are fundamentally bad people (43% to 33%). Again, Indian Hindus were the ethnic group mostly likely to lean Conservative in 2019, which might suggest that social views did factor into voting patterns for this group of ethnic minorities.

However, overall, there is not a clear link between the 2019 vote and social values among our non-white sample. Some ethnic groups where a large proportion of respondents hold more authoritarian social views still had a strong Labour vote in 2019- British Bangladeshis, non-white Muslims and Caribbeans are examples of this phenomenon.

Among the white population, the tie between social values and vote choice is clearer. The groups that display more authoritarian tendencies- white, older voters with a below degree-level education, were more likely to vote Conservative in 2019. Those who are younger and university-educated were more likely to vote Labour. While social values may be a good predictor of vote choice among the white population, the tie among ethnic minorities is not as clear cut.

White Britons tend to consistently be right-leaning in comparison to those who are not white, but are particularly divided along the axes of age and education. Ethnic minorities are more united in their approach to social values, with these demographic factors having a lesser impact. Yet whether this group tends to take a liberal or authoritarian view depends on the issue at hand, their ethnicity, and their religion.

Despite this, social values seem to have a clearer impact on the vote patterns of the white population than they do among ethnic minorities. This is clear from the fact that ethnic groups which consistently hold quite conservative social values- such as British Muslims or Black African voters- tend to vote Labour.

METHODOLOGY

The data underlying this report was collected via an online survey. In designing our sampling approach, we were minded of the difficulties in conducting robust polling of ethnic minorities in the UK. These include the usual underrepresentation of particular groups, including individuals above 65, born outside of the UK, or living in the country's most diverse, least integrated areas. Our sampling and weighting schemes were designed, as much as possible, to adjust for these sampling difficulties. While the sample does not match the quality of a random probability survey, it is an improvement on existing, smaller surveys. The final sample size of 4000 respondents means we can confidently examine smaller population subgroups.

SAMPLING AND FIELDWORK

Fieldwork was conducted online, using a blend of research panels and sources. Fieldwork began on 6th June 2023 and closed on 29th September 2023. We approached fieldwork through a multi-phase process. In the first phase, we collected 2000 respondents through the Focaldata platform, following strict quota management on age, gender, education, and ethnicity (at the 20-category level). We also used detailed area-level targeting to ensure we collected as many respondents as possible from the most diverse, least integrated areas of the country.

At the 2000-respondent mark, we paused fieldwork and assessed our sample at both the demographic and attitudinal levels. Specifically, we cross-checked our results against the 2014 YouGov BES panel on ethnic groups' perceptions of discrimination - a benchmark of sample quality. This 2000-person sample undersampled no-degree respondents and those born outside the UK. In the second phase of fieldwork, we oversampled both these groups and individuals over 65. We also expanded our recruitment beyond our existing panel base, sourcing respondents through external sources.

Following these two phases, we had a larger sample size than required (7000+ respondents), enabling us to iteratively trim the sample along key dimensions. Among other dimensions, we stratified our sample by a measure of socio-geographic representativeness. We defined these using MSOAs (2021 census) and divided them into 10 percentiles, based on the proportion of the total population who were both non-white and had no qualifications. In our trimming procedure, we ensured we retained respondents from the most deprived BAME areas of the country. Our final sample size, after rounds of trimming, was 4000 respondents.

WEIGHTING

We weighted our sample to age, gender, religion, ethnicity, tenure, ethnicity-religion interaction and socio-geographic percentiles statistics derived from the census. In the case of England and Wales, these were 2021 Census estimates, while in Scotland, these were 2011 Census estimates. The weights were applied using RIM weighting (random iterative method). This process iteratively adjusts weights until the sample distribution aligns with the population of these variables. We capped the weights at 3.5, affecting 48 cases. The weighting efficiency was 65.5%, and our weighted sample size, following the weight trimming, was 3920. The weighting scheme is detailed below.

WEIGHTING SCHEME

variable	value	pct
age	18 - 24	15.77%
age	25 - 34	22.85%
age	35 - 44	23.25%
age	45+	38.12%
gender	Female	51.55%
gender	Male	47.59%
gender	NA	0.86%
degree	Below degree	56.80%
degree	Degree	43.20%
religion	Any other religion	5.78%
religion	Buddhist	2.12%
religion	Christian	29.47%
religion	Hindu	10.71%
religion	Muslim	31.77%
religion	No religion	14.76%
religion	Sikh	5.40%
ethnicity	Any other ethnic group	9.18%
ethnicity	Arab	2.99%
ethnicity	Asian / Asian British: Bangladeshi	5.59%

ethnicity	Asian / Asian British: Chinese	5.19%
ethnicity	Asian / Asian British: Indian	19.06%
ethnicity	Asian / Asian British: Other	9.68%
ethnicity	Asian / Asian British: Pakistani	13.97%
ethnicity	Black / Black British: African	13.77%
ethnicity	Black / Black British: Caribbean	6.79%
ethnicity	Black / Black British: Other	2.10%
ethnicity	Mixed or multiple ethnic groups	11.68%
tenure	Owns outright	17.17%
tenure	Mortgage or shared	32.16%
tenure	Rents from a private landlord	24.66%
tenure	Rents from the council or a housing association	20.87%
tenure	Lives here rent-free	2.87%
tenure	Other	2.27%
ethnicity_religion	Asian_No religion	5.04%
ethnicity_religion	Asian_Christian	5.83%
ethnicity_religion	Asian_Buddhist	1.58%
ethnicity_religion	Asian_Hindu	9.88%
ethnicity_religion	Asian_Muslim	26.09%
ethnicity_religion	Asian_Sikh	4.35%
ethnicity_religion	Black_No religion	2.08%
ethnicity_religion	Black_Christian	16.21%
ethnicity_religion	Black_Muslim	4.15%
ethnicity_religion	Mixed_No religion	5.73%
ethnicity_religion	Mixed_Christian	4.74%
ethnicity_religion	Mixed_Muslim	1.09%
ethnicity_religion	Other_No religion	1.58%
ethnicity_religion	Other_Christian	2.87%
ethnicity_religion	Other_Muslim	5.43%
ethnicity_religion	Other_Any other religion	2.17%
ethnicity_religion	BlackAsianMixed_Any other religion	1.19%

bame_area_stratum	1	2.70%
bame_area_stratum	2	3.32%
bame_area_stratum	3	3.98%
bame_area_stratum	4	5.42%
bame_area_stratum	5	5.85%
bame_area_stratum	6	7.41%
bame_area_stratum	7	9.45%
bame_area_stratum	8	10.93%
bame_area_stratum	9	14.74%
bame_area_stratum	10	31.02%
bame_area_stratum	(Missing)	5.18%

2024 FIGURES

The 2024 election figures cited in Chapter 1 are based on a dataset collected by Focaldata over the course of the 2024 election campaign, and can be found [here](#). The data was weighted to match the final election results by region. Of this dataset, 6,393 respondents were from an ethnic minority background. This data was weighted to ethnic-minority population targets based on age group, gender, region, two-way education level, household tenure, ethnicity and ethnicity-religion interaction.

APPENDIX AND THE DATA USED IN THIS REPORT

An appendix to this report, detailing the results of modelling cited and the construction of scales used throughout, can be found on the [UK in a Changing Europe website](#).

The data used on this report can also be found at ukandeu.ac.uk. For any questions about the report or the data, please contact either sophie.stowers@ukandeu.ac.uk or manon@focaldata.com.

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